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Calculating Risk, Denying Uncertainty:
Seismicity and Hydropower Development in Nepal

Christopher Butler
Matthäus Rest

If Ulrich Beck’s definition of ‘risk society’
describes societies increasingly structured
by preoccupations with future environmental
threats and related insecurities created by
modernization, then Nepal’s hydropower
community would appear to be quite the
opposite, propelled into environmental denial
by twin demands for domestic electricity and
revenue earned through hydroelectric export.
Our research reveals that prior to the April
2015 earthquake in Nepal, the hydropower
community was engaging in what Eviatar
Zerubavel calls ‘socially organized denial,’
largely ignoring the uncertainties associated
with seismic activity. Earthquakes and tremors
were viewed as unavoidable realities that
should not impede hydropower development.
This denial, we argue, was shaped not only
by local political realities and demand for
electricity, but also by a larger desire to
capitalize on available funds from international
finance, which are highly contingent upon Nepal
presenting itself as a ‘safe’ zone for investment.

Our study focuses on the elites of Nepal’s hydro
community: the developers, investors, water
experts, and government officials who occupy
the ‘upstream’ positions at which scientific
knowledge is produced and adjudicated. On
one hand, the denial or omission of earthquake
potential that we witnessed seems to identify
the ineluctable challenges that Nepal faces
in attempting to integrate its economy into
global markets; on the other hand, it indicates
the desire of the private sector to reap
profits from hydropower in spite of obvious
geophysical dangers. These dangers, we
argue, are a bankable risk for these elites.
However, for the people directly affected by
new hydropower infrastructures, these are
risks and uncertainties threatening already
vulnerable livelihoods.
Keywords: seismicity, hydropower, infrastructure, uncertainty,
financialization of risk, Nepal.
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Introduction
The Nepal April 2015 earthquake devastated infrastructure
in the middle third of the country. It rendered many roads,
paths, bridges, and hillsides structurally unsafe for use or
habitation. Several hydropower plants were also knocked
off-line—a staggering blow for a country already contending with year-round load shedding, and needing reliable
energy to fuel its reconstruction efforts.
Given the country’s deep-seated aspirations for hydropower as a future pathway to development (Butler 2016;
Lord 2014; Rest 2012), analyses of the damage to existing
plants and those under construction quickly emerged.
The Nepal Electricity Authority reported that 150MW
(megawatts) of electricity generation had been lost in
the earthquake from a national portfolio of just 774MW
(Pangeni 2015), and that this loss represented an ‘acutely
small level of…capacity in a nation of 28 million people’
(Schneider 2015). Furthermore, several projects in development were set back months and years due to road
devastation, project repair needs, and construction materials being diverted to other post-quake reconstruction
needs, such as shelters, roads, hospitals, and schools. “This
is a huge setback to Nepal,” Ram Siwakoti from Chilime
Hydropower told the Nepali Times, “[W]e will need a lot of
time and money to recover fully” (Rai 2015). Khadga Bisht,
president of the Independent Power Producers Association
of Nepal (IPPAN), called the earthquake, “[t]he most devastating blow to Nepal’s energy sector after the Maoist war”
(ibid).
As the Nepali government and development agencies
continued to tally earthquake damage and future losses,
the hydropower community generated its own assessments (IPPAN 2015). In the months following the disaster,
quake-induced landslides followed, exacerbating the
already-sluggish efforts to restore hydropower plants.
Project officials at the Bhote Kosi project, a 45MW plant,
estimated its generation losses at 2,36GWh (gigawatt
hours), or $30 million (Pangeni 2016). Six months after the
earthquake, the government’s long-awaited Post-Disaster
Needs Assessment reported total energy sector losses
approaching NRs. 18.75 billion—or $178.5 million—and an
energy shortfall of 93MW by the start of 2016 (Giri 2015).
For the first time in decades, the earthquake and its
after-effects ushered doubt into discussions about the
viability of large-scale hydropower in Nepal and its ability
to buoy the economic prospects of the nation. Since the
government opened the hydro sector to private interests
in 1992, hydro professionals have battled vociferously
for a business milieu with qualities common to private
sectors in nations around the world: low regulation,
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investment-friendly tax rates, and expedited processes
for socio-environmental approval of projects (Butler
2016). But the earthquake had given weight to a host
of associated concerns, all of which would complicate
hydro-constructions even further: glacial lake outburst
floods (ICIMOD 2011) and the increased likelihood of landslides (Rai 2016).
To some Nepalis, this new reflexivity on the safety of
hydropower was long overdue (Thapa & Shrestha 2015).
But to others, the idea that serious doubt would suddenly
re-enter conversations about hydro-futures, seemed
delinquent and incongruous with the stated aim of
turning Nepal into a ‘hydropower nation’ (Lord 2014). To
investigate these contradictory perspectives on hydropower and seismicity, we draw on six years of fieldwork
in hydropower development in Nepal, including detailed
examinations of the private sector, and attending hydropower-related conferences, seminars, and presentations
at government institutions, private hydropower company
headquarters, and civil society-sponsored events. We have
each—together and separately—conducted interviews with
more than 80 private sector hydropower representatives
regarding their attitudes and opinions about hydropower,
Nepali economic development, the environmental and
economic impacts of hydropower, and seismicity. What we
have learned through these interactions is that our interlocutors work hard to render seismicity as a calculable risk
while denying the inherently uncertain character of their
calculations. Through this move, we argue, large-scale
hydropower development in Nepal becomes a business
option. At the same time, it brackets out the fact that
people living in close proximity to these future hydropower sites will have no devices at hand to calculate the
risks emanating from them, and will encounter growing
levels of uncertainty when it comes to the ramifications of
seismic activity.
“You just accept the risk.”
At the 2013 IPPAN Power Summit in Kathmandu, Nepali
military in drab green uniforms ringed the large ballroom
at the Soaltee Hotel. Men in business suits socialized over
coffee and tea, waiting for Nepal’s interim president, Ram
Baran Yadav. And then the ballroom went dark—the first
of seven power cuts for the day. The fact that this was a
hydropower conference couldn’t have made the irony any
thicker. After President Yadav and other ministers arrived
on stage, the crowd sat through a morning of benedictory
wishes from the Nepali government, the country representatives of well-known lending institutions, and a few
foreign diplomats. Each speaker told the audience that the
future of Nepal depended on hydropower development.

In the afternoon, the head of an interest group speaking for private hydro developers addressed the crowd,
stressing the need to create ‘bankable’ projects that would
appear ‘friendly’ to foreign companies and assure them
of profitable returns on investment. But the prospect of
improved electricity and infrastructure for Nepal, he said,
was only half the story. If Nepal could capitalize on its
6,000 rivers, hydro development could move the entire
country out of its ‘developing’ status, and, by virtue of free
markets, signal the fulfillment of the democratic principles
first pursued during the Jan Andolan movement in 1990.
His remarks were met with vigorous applause, and he concluded his presentation with a quote ascribed to Confucius:
“Set the goal right, but if it can’t be reached, don’t adjust
the goal. Hasten the pace.”
The topic of risk—a specific type of risk—dominated the
proceedings. A morning roundtable on the financial viability of hydropower projects discussed ‘acceptable risk
allocation’ and ‘sovereign risk,’ which were the risk factors
foreign investors would have to anticipate in an environment in which their investments would not necessarily be
covered by the same legal protections they could expect at
home. Then there were slideshows on commercial risks for
domestic developers, including currency fluctuations and
market variability on fuel prices and construction materials. Finally, another presenter summarized the project
risks in terms of cost overruns, worker performance, and
the availability of heavy construction machinery.
Beneath the surface of this roundtable, and many other
presentations from the conference, lingered a perceptible
anguish that felt like blame—blame on the Nepali government, and, in particular, the Nepal Electricity Authority
(NEA), the country’s parastatal responsible for electricity
generation, transmission, and distribution. When NEA’s
director presented his energy demand forecasts to the
audience, he sought to temper their claims and expectations by saying the free market itself was unpredictable
in terms of risk, a remark that drew a long line of angry
business people to the microphone for the Q&A. No, they
argued, the free market was the solution: it would distribute risk in a way that would stimulate production and
provide benefits for people in Nepal. They argued that
it was the government who inhibited this process. The
country head of the Asian Development Bank told the
audience that mitigation of risk should not be the private
developer’s burden.
Away from the conference scene, our interviews with
private hydro professionals also revealed a surprising
lack of acknowledgment of the potential for earthquakes
to pose a serious threat to the country. When questioned

directly about seismicity concerns, most respondents
bracketed seismic risk apart as an unpredictable, and thus
negligible, externality. As one developer put it, “Natural
calamities can happen anywhere. You just accept the risk.”
A few years earlier, in conversation with an Indian hydropower engineer who was preparing one of the major new
foreign-funded projects in Nepal, one of us asked about
the danger of a dam failure caused by an earthquake. He
replied: “This is a silly question. All the components will be
defined on the basis of earthquake risks.” That was that.
And yet, as quickly as a developer dismissed questions
about seismic risk, they would also vouch for the unpredictability of rivers. One respondent admitted that he
was concerned with the number of dams proposed for
construction in the case of seismic activity: “I’ve spent 35
years on these rivers… You always have that risk… they
are unpredictable.” A second developer told us, “The
Himalayas are young mountains and still have a lot of
motion in their formation.” But when asked if he thought
Nepal should curb its aspirations for hydro development,
he dismissed the notion because time was of the essence:
“If we don’t build hydropower now, India will build its own
and no longer need electricity from [Nepal].” So, how do
we explain this disjuncture between earthquake awareness
and lack of preparedness, particularly, for our purposes, in
the hydropower sector? How did these equally central discursive themes move in parallel for so long? Interviewed
by Spotlight Nepal, Bigyan Shrestha, CEO for the Upper
Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project made this admission:
Just parroting the lessons of 1934 earthquake and
focusing in Kathmandu alone would not be enough.
The situation has changed a lot in the last eight
decades. There are many hydropower projects,
road projects and other infrastructures close to epicenters and seismically vulnerable areas. So far as
hydropower plants are concerned, mountains and
Himalayan foothills are considered as good sites
because rocks are strong and good in these areas.
Thus, these areas have now turned into hub[s] for
hydropower. Before [the] April 25 earthquake, no
one had made an exact calculation on how earthquakes would damage these projects. Nepal lies in a
seismically active zone, particularly the Himalayas
and hills, we need to seriously study seismic vulnerabilities of the region before taking the projects.
(Shrestha 2015)
Indeed, our own research echoes Mr. Shrestha’s point.
Having conducted hundreds of interviews with hydro-professionals and politicians for the past six years in Nepali
and English, we have noted a lack of concern expressed by
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this group regarding the earthquake potential. Discussions
about seismicity risks were rare, and, when discussed
at all, commonly bracketed as an uncontrollable negative externality that could not and should not deter
hydro development.
Caught Unawares?
The idea of the ‘Big One’ has been a long-running existential threat in Nepali discourse since the 8.0 magnitude
Nepal-Bihar earthquake in 1934 that killed an estimated
11,000 people. And the general seismicity of Nepal is also a
largely accepted truth, supported by the country’s various
policies, plans, and programs dedicated to disaster preparedness and risk reduction. These include the Natural
Calamity Relief Act of 1982, the Nepal Risk Reduction
Consortium formed in 2009, and the Kathmandu Valley
Earthquake Risk Management Project. That the April 25
earthquake occurred on a Saturday likely saved thousands
of lives because school was not in session and that morning
many Nepali were outdoors enjoying the spring weather.
That the diminished loss of life was owed to any sort of
preparation on the part of the Nepali government and its
many multinational supporters was generally discounted
(Sharma 2015; Useem, Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan 2015).
Considering the current state of hydropower generation
in Nepal, it might be surprising to learn that in Nepal
electricity production started in 1911, more than 100 years
ago, with a 500 kW (kilowatt) hydropower plant on the
outskirts of Kathmandu. The fact that the second plant
was not built until 1934 shows that feudal elites of the time
did not see electricity as a means to increase productivity.
Instead, they regarded it as a luxury item, primarily used
to generate power for lighting their palaces in downtown
Kathmandu (Gyawali 2003: 72). To this day—at least in
people’s imagination—access to electricity remains closely
related to access to political and economic power.
The arrival of post-World War II (WWII) aid in the region
did not expedite hydropower generation in Nepal in the
same ways as it did in other parts of the region, like India
and Pakistan. A World Bank report from 1964 stated that
only the cities of Kathmandu and Biratnagar enjoyed
a regular electricity supply, and that only one-fifth of
the national generating capacity of 10 MW came from
hydropower. After an additional 20 MW of hydropower
production was slated for commission in the late 1960s,
the World Bank authors reasoned that, ‘there seems to
be no need for any other major additions to generating capacity for the time being’ (World Bank 1964: 32).
This attitude towards electricity production has been a
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long-standing complaint voiced by many of our interlocutors in the hydro sector who blame the Bank’s decades
of conservative forecast projections for the long delay in
hydropower production.
While the World Bank report underestimated (by today’s
needs) the potential for hydropower consumption in
Nepal, it did recognize the need for an improved institutional arrangement of electricity production and
distribution. Eventually, and with strong support from
the Bank, the government created the Nepal Electricity
Authority (NEA) in 1985 to establish ‘an independent
electricity authority to be run on a businesslike basis,’ as
already demanded in the 1964 report (ibid: 33)—a goal of
which the NEA has fallen short of meeting, in the opinion
of most Nepalis with whom we have spoken. NEA operates as the owner of all transmission infrastructure and
as the sole distributor of electricity to end consumers.
Additionally, NEA generates approximately two-thirds of
the country’s hydropower.
Since 1990, the private sector (also referred to as ‘independent power producers’) has been allowed to construct
hydropower projects, but this sector must negotiate power
purchasing agreements with the NEA. This mandatory
arrangement has been the long-standing focal point of
conflict between the NEA, the private sector, and individual electricity consumers. The NEA has developed a
reputation as one of the most dysfunctional institutions
in a country without a shortage of badly managed government offices, and has consistently run at a loss in terms of
revenue: a condition they blame on the weak Nepali rupee,
but which the public and many development agencies
blame on workplace inefficiencies, a bloated workforce
backed by a powerful and inflexible union, and blatant
corruption. Recent investigative journalism inquires have
revealed that significant blame for the last decade of
load-shedding in Nepal was due to NEA officials selling and
redistributing electricity to industrial consumers illegally
in exchange for lucrative kick-backs (Sangraula 2017).
However, despite these complicating issues, post-earthquake multi-national financing has begun to flow into
the country. In fall 2016, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC)—the private sector arm of the World
Bank—announced its intention to increase its portfolio
in Nepal from its original pledge of $500 million in 2014.
IFC’s country director for Nepal, Wendy Werner, said the
investments, particularly in hydropower, would bring
qualitative change to Nepal’s economy and way of life.
Similarly, other multi-national organizations, such as the
Italian-Thai Development Corporation (a stakeholder in

the planned Upper Karnali hydroelectric project), the
China-based Sino Hydro corporation, as well as Indian
developers SJVN and GMR, have looked to invest in Nepali
hydropower. Despite the lack of specific data on all of
these new actors, we did not find a different approach
towards seismicity when compared with local industry
representatives, in our numerous conversations with some
of these multi-national actors.
These concerns and struggles voiced by the private sector
belie the fact that, as far as hydropower development is
concerned, the current moment is indeed a crucial one
for them. Growing disdain and impatience for government ineptitude and public perceptions of its rent-seeking
behavior have placed significant political intentions and
support behind private interests and companies in order to
lead Nepali development in this century. For this reason,
understanding the private sector’s view of seismicity is
crucial because it holds significant favor and influence in
determining the manner and scope of debates about both
hydropower and development more generally. In today’s
discussions about what constitutes ‘risk,’ the private sector
is establishing a worldview in which risk is not about
natural factors, but is rather about economic ones, over
which they spin an illusion of control and management.
Our argument begins from a premise that society shapes
patterns of perception, memory, and organizational
aspects of thinking. In this context, we ask how people
cope with information that is available. Like so many
people around the world who are now well-versed in the
reality and potential effects of climate change, hydropower
professionals’ and government officials’ actions seldom
reflect what the scientific community has long known
about the Himalayas: it is a relatively young geologic area,
exceptionally prone to seismic activity (Champati ray et al.
2006; Khattri 1987; Kumar Nath 2004). These geologic qualities, then, should be reflected in national discourse around
hydropower, which calls for extreme and transformative
impositions of infrastructure into such natural landscapes.
And yet, our research and experience show it was not.
At the core of this discussion is a consideration of both risk
and uncertainty, as well as of the competing definitions
and interpretations of risk. We are not the first to ask
these questions. In their updated volume, Thompson et al.
(2007) note that a dearth of solid research about Nepal’s
environmental problems had manifested itself as a milieu
of uncertainty regarding how the country could address its
ecological challenges. On one hand, no one doubted that
forests were being over-harvested for timber; aerial photographs could show completely denuded hillsides. But,

how much over-harvesting had taken place, and by what
percentage? And how much replanting and time would
these hillsides need to recover? The absence of these facts
thwarted action on the part of Nepali institutions.
With respect to hydropower, we focus on how uncertainty is, or is not, expressed in terms of risk. Our research
suggests that the private hydropower sector and related
development agencies are giving more and more weight to
a rationalized view of risk, much along the lines of Ulrich
Beck’s view of risk, which focuses on what can be measured, as opposed to what should be measured (2006). This
view contrasts starkly with the perception of local residents living around future and present hydropower sites.
Following Arjun Appadurai (2011) we argue that directly
affected people are not actually dealing with risk, but
extreme uncertainty about the future of their lives, homes,
and livelihoods—far beyond their access to electricity.
Whereas professionals use models to project the structural
integrity of dams and potential earnings from electricity
sales, the people living in close proximity to hydropower
projects have no way to calculate and manage the ‘risks’
that these interventions will mean on the ground.
Socially Organized Denial
The slow government response to the 2015 earthquake in
Nepal threatens to exacerbate social inequality, alter community structures, and generate new patterns of economic
and social conflict. How is it that this major catastrophic
event has failed to cause a strong response from the hydropower industry? What can explain the disjuncture between
lived experience and public concern? What can we say
about the prevailing opinions about seismicity that existed
prior to the 2015 earthquake and continue to neutralize
or muffle a stronger outcry for stricter regulations on
hydropower development? To discuss this issue, we engage
what Eviatar Zerubavel calls ‘socially organized denial’
regarding the risks of hydropower in a seismically active
area (2002). Conventional thinking suggests that if people
understood the threat of earthquakes in the Himalayan
region, they would change their thinking about matters
such as hydropower, just as we would expect that people
would take more substantial initiatives to fight climate
change once the scientific evidence reached the level of
preponderance. And yet, this is not the case.
The concept of socially organized denial traverses the
fields of psychology and sociology to investigate “the
mental processes of attending and ignoring” (Zerubavel
1997: 11) in “response to social circumstances, and carried
out through a process of social interaction” (Norgaard

HIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 19

2006: 352). While much of this work has focused on human
enormities (Cohen 2001) and political apathy (Eliasoph
1998), we are joining a conversation with Norgaard who
has used cognitive sociology to investigate and interpret
the various means by which Norwegians, among others,
have resisted to engage with climate change initiatives in
the face of mounting evidence and impacts (2011).
Socially organized denial is context-specific, informed
and shaped by the culture(s) in which it forms. Individuals
negotiate prevailing ideologies and engage in identifiable
patterns of rhetoric, which we can analyze in order to
delineate the boundaries within which the debate over a
particular issue is confined. As we will see in our examples to follow, debates about seismicity and hydropower
are strictly limited within a narrative in which Nepal’s
future and hopes are inextricably tied to its success in
hydropower development. Therefore, discussions that
stray too far from this central argument tend to be few
and unexpressed.
Various groups within a debate, which occupy distinct
positions of power, have unequal access to move discussions toward their guiding points of reference. Sutton and
Norgaard (2013) were correct to connect this element of
organized denial to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1971),
that dominant groups maintain their positions culturally
by securing collective consent to their ideas. This discussion suggests that while hegemonic discourses are cultural
processes bound by perception, many forms of denial are
produced (and contested). Culturally prescribed norms
about how to think (or not think) about things reflect a
particularly insidious form of social control.
If socially organized denial is shaped in response to social
circumstance, Nepali hydropower’s version of denial
would be defined by the country’s long-standing and
frustrating attempts at development. Numerous scholars
have documented the deeply engrained nature of development in Nepal (cf. Pigg 1993; Shrestha 1997), wherein being
developed (‘bikasi’ in Nepali) or not developed (‘abikasit’
in Nepali) prevails as a fundamental distinction between
urban and rural populations, and between those who are
‘modern’ and those who are not. This frustration is further
compounded by an unstable and unproductive government which has, as of this writing, re-formed 26 times
since the democratic revolution in 1990, each new iteration bringing in a new roster of ministers and visions to
lead the country who are ultimately unable to succeed.
No country can improve its economic standing and the
livelihoods of its residents without a stable and reliable
source of energy (Barnes and Floor 1996; Lee 2005). In this
context, Nepal’s weak economy has opened space for the
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private sector to state its case for leading development,
arguing that state-led and donation-backed programs have
failed to make appreciable returns for the average Nepali.
The hydropower sector has seized this moment to fight for
decreasing regulation of their industry, suggesting that for
every day that passes, every drop of water that cascades
from the mountains without passing a turbine represents
lost revenue and opportunity for the country. Both the
Nepalese state and the hydropower industry only see
‘falling water’ (Gyawali 2003). By this standard, expediting
hydro development and downplaying the inherent risks
makes ‘sense.’
Risk and Uncertainty
In his essay, ‘The Cultural Nature of Risk,’ Åsa Boholm
rhetorically asks what social anthropologists can contribute to risk research. His answer is: context (2003: 174). He
roots his conclusion in a discussion of Mary Douglas and
Ulrich Beck, who differ in how they regard the need for
an analytic distinction between traditional and modern
models of risk. For Douglas and other cultural theorists,
Boholm writes, “explanations in terms of ‘risk’ in modern
society are understood to fulfil the same social function as
explanations in terms of destiny, supernatural agency, or
broken taboo in traditional societies” (2003: 165). In other
words, for cultural theorists, risk, like taboos, is subjectively chosen and culturally constructed to exert social
control over a population, thus eliminating the need to
analytically separate the concept of ‘risk’ from the concept
of ‘taboo.’
Beck, by contrast, posits risk as a new element that permeates all modern interactions and discourse, the product
of an economic system that attempts to simultaneously
instantiate and mystify risk through de-contextualized
calculations and rational decision-making models (1992).
In this way, risk appears ‘objective.’ He defines risk as
“phenomena and causality in the natural world that can
have harmful effects” (Boholm 2003: 161). This ‘objective’
and modern notion of risk differs from the cultural theory
turn in the sense that it stands apart from society in the
realm of mathematics, unlike the notion of taboo, which
grounds itself in the community and its behaviors.
Boholm seeks a middle ground when it comes to analyzing risk—a ground in which we root our analysis. To call
something a ‘risk’ implies values and subjective judgment,
and yet, determining probability of events and occurrences through statistics has a largely accepted predictive
ability. The power of numbers and rational models can
illuminate optimum paths devoid of human errors in judgment. However, history is rife with examples of people and
institutions choosing otherwise. The 2008 global recession,

triggered by the collapse of the American housing market,
is perhaps one of the best examples of this incongruity:
trillions of dollars were lost due to a subjective belief
that housing values would always rise, when, in fact,
a closer look at the details showed collapse was imminent (Lewis 2011).
With respect to the Nepal earthquake, a subjective definition of risk might attend to how hillsides are utilized,
occupied, and maintained. This could affect settlement
patterns as populations move to higher ground to avoid
earthquake-induced landslides, such as those in Langtang
and Gorkha which obliterated several villages (Pokhrel
2015). In rural areas such as these, natural disasters have
often been explained as angry divine responses to transgressional human behavior. On the Sunkoshi River in 2014,
150 people were killed in a landslide that several residents
attributed to misbehavior at a local naga, or serpent spirit,
shrine (Personal communication Weena Pun, 15 August
2014). The 2015 Everest avalanche triggered by a falling
serac was interpreted by many as divine retribution to
the increasing mass tourism that was despoiling relations
between human and more-than-human entities (Personal
communication, Ben Ayers, 22 February 2016; see also
GlacierHub 2015). In line with our broader argument, these
explanations show that for people facing living conditions
shaped by deep uncertainties and a severe lack of reliable
scientific data, calculating (or even estimating) risk in
these terms is not a strategy they apply widely.
An objective interpretation of risk would calculate the
time since the last earthquake, seismometric readings of
vibrations in the earth’s crust, and measurements of the
levels of escaping radon gas. In spite of these preferred
optics with which to gauge potential earthquakes, the scientific community has no illusions about its ability: “The
USGS [United States Geological Survey] nor any scientist
have ever predicted a major earthquake. They do not know
how, and they do not expect to know in the foreseeable
future” (USGS 2016). Curiously, however, the USGS goes on
to say, “Based on scientific data, probabilities can be calculated for potential future earthquakes” (ibid). And this
is a key admission. While no one can predict earthquakes,
we operate and build in a world where probabilities and
speculation are used to determine levels of risk.
Thus, in our study of socially organized denial, the
definition of risk in Nepal appears to be a site of contestation—much like the battles over taste (Bourdieu 1984),
official knowledge (Dove 2006), and scientific standards
(Latour 1993). What will be the hegemonic view of risk
in Nepal’s infrastructural development? Our research
suggests that the increasing rise of the private sector is
shifting its views of risk away from being subjective and

culturally-determined, and towards an understanding of
risk as objectively calculable. This process is aided and
abetted by the private financial interests and development
agencies that fund hydropower projects.
Much of the risk research today tends to focus on capitalism and the financial mechanisms that are spawned
to create value amidst rules and regulations that seek to
limit fraud and excessive gain. Though seemingly a far-cry
from the topic of earthquakes and hydropower, it is the
general orientation of financiers and their reliance on
models, predictability, and the data they choose to analyze
that draw our interest. The highly-rational form of risk
assessment that we witness in Nepali hydropower seems to
reflect an ascendance of financial institutions worldwide,
generally: to define risk, to suggest means for hedging risk,
and to determine how much risk the individual is responsible for vis-à-vis other individuals and/or corporations.
Like finance, we need to inspect the legitimating principles
guiding hydropower construction in Nepal. As the 2015
earthquake reminds us, it appears the ‘techniques of calculability…have far exceeded the organizations and tools for
its management, hence opening a new distance between
expert and popular understandings of risk (Appadurai
2011: 528). The ethos of hydropower professionals working
in Nepal, those who play and shape the game, perpetuates
a process that is ‘simultaneously discursive, technical,
institutional, and ideological’ (ibid: 526), by which they
attempt to push uncertainty out of the picture, albeit not
entirely successfully.
Appearances and Spectacular Accumulation
Socially organized denial has a specific context and temporality in which it emerges to influence public thinking
about earthquakes, hydropower, and risk. But there is
more going on here than simple denial. At this particular
historical moment, as Nepal searches for development and
electricity, it is not enough that the hydro industry simply
goes about its work. It needs to sell a vision, a future, not
just for the average Nepali, but, more importantly, for
the finance needed to build these projects, and for the
government to help create more favorable conditions for
completing this work.
Private hydropower interests advance this vision through
a series of tropes about water as national destiny, hydropower as development, and the fulfillment of democratic
promise. To be successful, private hydropower has to
present a confident image of certain profit in order to
realize itself through foreign investment—whether from
private firms or development banks. They engage in what
Tsing calls the ‘economy of appearances.’ Promoting
hydropower as profitable and its associated risk as calHIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 21

culable is a “conjuring trick, a drama… a self-conscious
making of… spectacle [as] a necessary aid to gathering
investment funds” (Tsing 2000: 118). When you trace out
the string of people who desire hydropower to arrive as a
business, who want certain returns, who want discussions
of risk circumscribed to the topic of guaranteeing profit,
you can understand how they could be convinced to deny
serious credence to possible earthquakes. It doesn’t fit
the narrative.
The private hydropower narrative sells images of illuminated rural homes, children studying late into the
evenings under lamps, social programs sprouting up from
fully-filled government coffers, and urban homes stocked
with modern appliances, surging to life, at any time of day,
with the press of a button. Nature must be ‘made into loot,’
and Nepal is told it’s not water but money that pours down
its rivers, unrealized and wasted. This conjuring trick has
its roots in notions of frontier culture, asking participants
to see a landscape that doesn’t yet exist, the same way that
the US gold rush invited white immigrants to envision the
American West. It is reminiscent of Georg Simmel’s (2011:
482) insight about the monetization of value: “Gauging
values in terms of money has taught us to determine and
specify values down to the last farthing…The ideal of
numerical calculability has been made possible in practical, and perhaps even in intellectual, life only through the
money economy.”
These private sector machinations in support of finance
are possible due to a prevailing national discipline that
says development is necessary, and the government has
failed in its responsibility do deliver development. This
argument effectively produces a political quietude that
does not question risk and dismisses protest as the work of
rogue individuals rather than legitimate groups (Adhikari
2011), which then enables the state to draw in military
suppression of future protests without much comment
from the public. Hydropower becomes a tool of what Tsing
refers to as ‘spectacular accumulation,’ a means of creating ‘value’ through speculation and spectacle, and often
at great cost to those who would reap none of the profits.
Investors are “looking for the appearance of success. They
cannot afford to find out if a product is solid,” or free
from risks such as earthquakes (Tsing 2000: 141). To meet
this demand from the market, hydro developers must sell
potential, not product. And uncertainty cannot be entertained within this model.
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Conclusion
As Nepal develops and becomes a ‘global nation,’ it
needs to be noted that this term connotes an opening up
process in which new areas submit to foreign investment,
first and foremost the hydropower sector. In order to
attract foreign capital, hydropower developers engage in
complex calculations of the risk involved in these projects.
However, such risk calculations may be entirely beside
the point if earthquakes cannot be accurately predicted.
Based on our interviews, the main datasets included in
these risk analyses focus on the development of electricity
production and consumption tariffs, which are combined
with assessments of the political developments in India
and China. At the moment, we sense an extreme amount
of urgency to bring the proposed and long delayed largescale projects on track (and eventually on line) before the
Indian government follows through with its announcements to substantially increase its solar and nuclear power
generation. This would effectively erase Nepal’s ability to
profit from the harvest of hydropower, and would dismiss
the electricity-export-driven development model Nepalese
elites have been working on for decades.
Most importantly, though, these risk analysis models
exclude those factors that cannot be calculated: reduced
water flow and the increased danger of glacial lake
outburst floods due to climate change, and the threat of
future earthquakes. If discussed, these natural events are
conceptualized like financial risks, that is, risks that can
be managed through calculation. But the seismic risk to
a potential hydropower site simply cannot be calculated.
What we are actually talking about, then, is uncertainty.
As Appadurai (2011: 524) reminds us, “uncertainty remains
outside of all financial devices and models.”
The denial of uncertainty serves an important purpose
in maintaining the promise of Nepal as a future ‘hydropower nation’ (Lord 2014). As with many other financial
devices, it helps to obscure the fact that those who make
a living with the financialization of risk are seldom those
who have to live with the uncertainties produced by its
ramifications. In the case of hydropower development in
Nepal, the affected communities have always already been
among the most vulnerable: predominantly peasants who
subsistence-farm in geologically highly unstable mountains. Many of these families are indigenous, and already
contend with institutionalized forms of discrimination that
inhibit their ability to provide for themselves.

In other words, we suggest that the private sector is poised
to exploit what Frickel and Vincent (2011) call ‘undone
science,’ places where horizontal and vertical knowledge gaps intersect, leaving a void wherein uncertainty
about environmental issues can be amplified or denied
for political gain. In post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans,
some parishes had extensive soil sampling for contamination while other areas were neglected. When activists
complained, the US Environmental Protection Agency
deepened their testing, but did not expand it to those
neglected areas. In this way, the scientific community
learned more information about fewer locations, which did
not necessarily improve the level of knowledge overall. In
a similar fashion, the lack of seismic knowledge as it relates
to hydropower construction provides another opening
in which the private sector can advance its position—by
claiming the importance of thorough studies on safety and
environmental impact—without actually knowing whether
the structures it designs will be prepared to withstand a
major earthquake. On the other hand, civil society and
anti-dam activists cannot marshal an opposition to dam
construction in seismic zones beyond supposition. That
is, having little evidence for their position, they can only
warn about the danger of dam breach as a possibility
rather than a likelihood. In Nepal’s energy-starved, development-seeking context, theirs is indeed a weak position.
Through local employment, electrification, improved
infrastructural access, and possible local social development, hydropower projects may open up exciting
potentialities for local communities. Recent project development agreements, such as the one for the Upper Karnali
Hydroelectric Project, have the availability of shares for
affected people written into the terms of the contract. In
some parts of Nepal, share options in hydro projects have
attracted high levels of interest from local small-scale
investors (ShareSansar 2016).
But, communities around these proposed dam sites will
also have to live with the increased uncertainties these
projects will bring to their villages. Generations of rural
communities have been taught that the village is a backward place and that the Nepalese state will change those
conditions (Pigg 1992). Perhaps it is not surprising, then, to
note that it was predominantly old women who expressed
negative feelings about the imminent hydropower boom
in the Arun valley (Rest 2012). Whether the 2015 earthquakes will change the discourse on risk and uncertainty
on the Nepalese hydropower frontier remains to be seen.
In line with Boholm’s proposition, we are convinced that
we will need more anthropological research to address
this question.
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